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Negotiating Media ‘Balance’ in Malaysia’s 
2013 General Election 
Ross Tapsell 
Abstract: This article will discuss recent trends in Malaysia’s media sur-
rounding the 2013 general election (GE13). It will argue that the GE13 
produced two important trends in the media industry. First, there was in-
creased political-party participation in social media, citizen journalism and 
blogging. In fact, it practically led to a ‘cyberwar’ between political parties, 
making the realm of the online and social media increasingly polarised and 
partisan. Second, many mainstream media outlets in Malaysia successfully 
pursued a platform of more ‘balanced’ coverage, suggesting an increased 
space of negotiation and contestation amongst the previously muzzled print, 
television and radio industry. This article will conclude with an assessment 
of the future trends in the media industry in Malaysia post GE13. 
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Introduction 
Malaysia’s general election on 5 May 2013 (hereafter the GE13) saw the 
government defeat the opposition by 133 seats to 89. In doing so, the in-
cumbent government continued its long rule over the country, which began 
in 1957. The government coalition, or Barisan Nasional (BN), consists of 
three major parties: the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the 
Malaysian Chinese Association (the MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Con-
gress (MIC). The opposition coalition Pakatan Rakyat (PR) includes the 
People’s Justice Party (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the 
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). The opposition won the popular vote, 
which followed continuing erosion of the popular vote for the ruling regime, 
which had occurred in the previous election in 2008, and an upswing in 
support for the opposition. Gerrymandering has been cited by many politi-
cal observers and scholars as one reason for the BN maintaining its rule in 
an election dubbed by the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs 
and the Centre for Public Policy Studies as “partially free, but not fair” (Ma-
laysian Insider 2013a). This conclusion was supported by numerous political-
science scholars who study elections in the Southeast Asian region (Welsh 
2013; Weiss 2013a; Aspinall 2013).  
Malaysia’s political system has been described as “electoral” authoritari-
anism (Schedler 2006) where the BN “has refrained from grossly rigging or 
stealing elections, instead perpetuating its dominance through subtler strata-
gems for more than three decades” (Case 2006: 312). One of these strata-
gems has been to restrict freedoms of the press, where the mainstream me-
dia in Malaysia is “shackled” (Mohd Azizuddin 2005) and subject to “strin-
gent controls” (Abbott 2011a: 16). However, Prime Minister Mahathir’s 
decision in 1996 not to regulate or censor the Internet means the strict laws 
applied to the print media were less relevant to those who produced news 
and views online. While the online media in Malaysia is not exempt from 
legal pressure (sedition and defamation charges have still been used to intim-
idate those who criticise the regime through the Internet), Malaysia’s media 
has largely been seen as a free and vibrant online space clearly distinct from 
the restricted, pro-government mainstream media (Mustafa K. Anuar 2005; 
Jun-E Tan and Zawawi Ibrahim 2008; Mohd Azizuddin 2005). The research 
presented here will examine how media practitioners and government and 
opposition media strategists reflect on their roles in the coverage of the 
GE13. It will do so through targeted personal interviews with those in-
volved in Malaysia’s media as well as media managers employed by political 
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parties.1 Jason Abbott explained that new technologies such as the Internet 
and social media were useful in furthering social movements during Malay-
sia’s 2008 election, but concluded “how Southeast Asia’s autocrats respond 
to this and whether they prove any more adept than the regimes that suc-
cumbed to popular uprisings in North Africa in 2011 remains to be seen” 
(Abbott 2011b: 27). The next section will answer the question of how the 
Malaysian government in particular has responded to the challenge of new 
media in the lead-up to the 2013 election.
Online and Social Media 
In the past, the term “Fifth Estate” has been used to describe NGOs, trade 
unions and even organised crime (Bequai 1979). More recently, however, the 
expression has come to mean reporting via the Internet and related digital 
media, which includes bloggers, citizen journalists and social media, and thus 
is seen as separate from the industrial, mainstream media, previously the 
realm of the “Fourth Estate”. Scholars claim this “Fifth Estate media” is 
creating a space to enable a new source of accountability in government, 
politics and other sectors and therefore supports liberal democracy (Dutton 
2009; Newman, Dutton and Blank 2012). Malaysian bloggers have deemed 
their role in “the Fifth Estate” as crucial for the push towards media free-
dom and balance in the public sphere. Popular blogger Raja Petra Kama-
ruddin wrote in 2012:  
the rise of the fifth estate […] gives people the ability and function to 
share and disseminate thoughts on a global scale. This in turn has 
made governments and their monopoly of the fourth estate irrelevant, 
thus leading to governments and leaders themselves moving onto cy-
berspace in order to stake their claim (Raja Petra 2012). 
This section will examine online and social media during the GE13 and 
explain that cyberspace is becoming increasingly manipulated and polarised 
by political-party discourse. 
1  22 personal interviews were conducted in Kuala Lumpur in June 2013. Due to time 
constraints, not all media outlets were able to be targeted for personal interviews. 
Those chosen were outlets considered to have attempted to provide reasonable 
coverage of both the opposition and government. They included Astro Awani (TV), 
BFM (radio), Sinar Harian and Oriental Daily (Malay and Chinese print newspapers) 
and Malaysian Insider (online news). Media strategists from the main government 
party UMNO and from the main opposition parties DAP and PKR were also in-
terviewed. 
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There is little doubt the online and social media has become increasing-
ly important in political discourse in Malaysia. Total Internet penetration in 
Malaysia increased from 1,718,500 in 2008 to 5,839,600 in 2012 (Gomez 
2013). Malaysia has 13 million Facebook users and two million Twitter users 
(Social Bakers 2013) in a population of 29 million. Social media is particular-
ly popular amongst Malaysian youths. 64 per cent of Facebook users in 
Malaysia are between 18 and 34 years old, while 62 per cent of the total 
unique visitors to the Internet were aged between 15 and 34 (Social Bakers 
2013). With first-time voters making up approximately 30 per cent of the 
13.3 million registered voters in Malaysia for the GE13, the Internet was 
considered an important tool in influencing voter choice, particularly in 
urban areas. Prior to the GE13, social media had played a predominant role 
in mobilising events such as the Bersih rallies and in the flourishing of anti-
government material spread by young urbanites. In her article published 
before the GE13, Meredith Weiss (2013b: 3) argues that new media “does 
seem more likely than their progenitors to help shift the political ground in 
Malaysia”, but that effects “are more likely to be subtle and gradual rather 
than immediate and cataclysmic”. She concludes by explaining that young 
voters’ “political identities will have been moulded in a fundamentally dif-
ferent discursive environment than those of their elders” (Weiss 2013: 19). 
Pepinksy (2013) agrees that new media has created “new challenges” for the 
BN and “new tactics” for the opposition, but in itself is unlikely to cause 
political liberalisation in Malaysia. Research on the GE13 conducted for this 
article supports this argument and will show that the UMNO in particular is 
embracing cyberspace as a “new challenge” to master. 
After the BN won the 2008 election but lost their crucial two-thirds 
majority,2 President Abdullah Badawi stated that his government had “lost 
the Internet war, the cyberwar” and said of new media:  
We didn’t think it was important. It was serious misjudgement. We 
thought the newspapers, the print media, the television were im-
portant, but young people were [actually] looking at text messages and 
blogs (Ahmad Fauziah et al. 2012). 
Abdullah Badawi was replaced as Prime Minister in April 2009 by Najib 
Razak (hereafter Najib). Many BN officials believed the government was 
inadequately adept in the space of Internet news and views in 2008, and 
were looking to maintain a greater presence in cyberspace during the GE13. 
In the lead-up to the election, Najib said the election will be “Malaysia’s first 
social media election” (Free Malaysia Today 2013). The Deputy Prime Minis-
ter’s political strategist, Marzuki Mohamad, argued:  
2  To change the constitution in Parliament, a two-thirds majority is required. 
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To a certain extent, this was the social-media election: we had young 
urbanites, IT-savvy, sometimes with two or three mobile phones, im-
pacting the messages on social media, which we believe affected the 
voting pattern. The role of social media was certainly more prominent 
than it was in the last election (interview, 15 June 2013).  
The result was increased mobilisation of political supporters through Face-
book and Twitter. What followed was described as a ‘cyberwar’, involving 
‘cybertroopers’, fake Twitter accounts, deliberate misinformation and in-
creased paid mobilisation of online participants for direct political causes. 
The GE13 saw many pro-government bloggers gain prominence. They 
included Papa Gomo, Rocky’s Bru, Helen Ang, The Choice and The Mole. 
Since reformasi in 1998, the BN has recognised that blogging is an important 
way of disseminating viewpoints online, but traditionally, it has not been 
particularly active in producing its own bloggers and online commentators. 
Gong’s (2008) study showed that during Malaysia’s 2008 general election, 
those candidates who maintained a blog were more likely to succeed in be-
ing elected than those who did not. In the 2008 election, political bloggers 
who criticised the government included some prominent names: Raja Petra 
Kamaruddin (Malaysia Today), Haris Ibrahim (People’s Parliament) and Jeff Ooi 
(Screenshots), plus opposition leader Lim Kit Siang. This “helped to create a 
major shift among the middle class and sent many concerned citizens into 
political action” (Chin and Wong 2009: 80). Tun Faisal was head of the 
‘UMNO Cybertroopers’ during the GE13. He said: “There is a change in 
that people are less dependent on traditional media for information. We 
wanted to increase the pro-government news portals [in the GE13]” (inter-
view, 15 June 2013). Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s 
blog was again a popular choice for many Malaysians, while a considerable 
number of Malaysian MPs maintained a blog for the GE13, including Najib 
himself at <www.1Malaysia.com.my>. Marzuki (interview, 15 June 2013) 
said what the result of this increase meant to his party: “In the blog war, BN 
has the upper hand. We are there.” Pro-government bloggers were said to 
earn about 10,000 MYR (3,036 USD) per month, with bloggers who were 
prominent being paid more for their writing. While these sites were nowhere 
near as popular as the independent news sites Malaysiakini or The Malaysian 
Insider, the step does reflect a more centralised, nuanced BN online media 
campaign than in previous elections.3 The Malaysian government had em-
3  Alexa has Malaysiakini.com ranked the 18th most popular website, with Malay-
sianinsider.com ranked 39th. In contrast, 1Malaysia.com.my is ranked 2,230th. Pre-
vious online campaigns by the BN have focused around the distribution of fake sex 
videos of opposition candidates, including opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim. The 
GE13 saw the occasional attempt at this form of online slander, but internal polling 
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ployed British- and American-based public-relations companies ApCo and 
the Renden Group, which were awarded multi-million-dollar contracts by 
the Malaysian Prime Minister’s office to assist with the government’s media 
campaigns, amongst other tasks. The group had fifteen people and six local 
hires to establish internal communications and media monitoring, for exam-
ple. 
In addition to blogs, the BN was looking to maintain a greater presence 
in the realm of social media. In 2010, Prime Minister Najib issued a directive 
that all government ministers should have a Facebook account, and prefera-
bly a Twitter account as well. A Twitter account was created for Najib in 
September 2008 and his office started to tweet as @PMOMalaysia from 
September 2010. Tun Faisal’s ‘UMNO Cybertroopers’, a team unofficially 
established in 2004, was moved within a special new media unit [Unit Media 
Baru UMNO] headed by UMNO Youth leader Khairy Jamaluddin. As Tun 
Faisal explained: 
There is a change in that people are less dependent on traditional me-
dia for information. BN understood going into the elections that so-
cial media was important, not just blogs. The PM believes this. Khairy 
[Jamaluddin] knows the importance of social media and we brief the 
PM about it (interview, 15 June 2013).  
At the age of 37, Khairy Jamaluddin was considered a key candidate in ap-
pealing to Malaysia’s youth. Popularly known as ‘KJ’, he is particularly active 
on Facebook and Twitter.4 The @barisannasional Twitter account was cre-
ated in May 2012 and was reportedly promoted for a three-month campaign 
at a cost of 15,000 USD (The Malaysian Insider 2013b). In a medium where 
numbers are considered currency, Najib currently has 1,667,961 followers 
on Twitter. Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim has around 359,280. Yet 
research from the organisation Politweet found that 52.5 per cent of Najib’s 
then 1.2 million Twitter followers were actually inactive [0 tweets and 0 
followers, or suspended users].5 Reports had surfaced online that Najib had 
the most fake Twitter followers (Malaysiakini 2013a). It is possible some of 
these accounts do belong to real users who employ Twitter to follow people 
and not to tweet or be followed, but even so, 52.5 per cent is dubious at best. 
                                                                                                         
by both the government and opposition found that attacks on character through 
sex videos were not of interest to voters in the GE13.  
4  After winning the seat of Rembau in Negri Sembilan at GE13, he was appointed 
Minister for Youth and Sport.  
5  Another way to test Twitter followers is to see when they signed on to Twitter. 
When five accounts are created at one time (albeit with separate names) to immedi-
ately follow one particular politician and no-one else, it looks suspicious, to say the 
least. 
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The suggestion that both the government and the opposition specifical-
ly employed people to slander politicians online was a feature of the GE13 
social-media campaign. Bloggers started to circulate warnings of paid ‘cyber-
troopers’ nearly two years before the actual election took place (Malaysia 
Today 2011), with estimations that one full-time ‘cybertrooper’ would receive 
about 5,000 MYR (1,518 USD) per month. Tun Faisal estimated that the 
UMNO had about 45 paid full-time workers, 175 part-timers and 750 volun-
teers in his UMNO Cybertroopers Club for the GE13. He said:  
The Internet was previously dominated by the opposition. It allows 
them so much space. Now we have a presence. Our bloggers – our 
cybertroopers – are on the ground, too. We post on issues [and] we 
provide information (interview, 15 June 2013).  
Faisal also added that the creation of a more systematic and extensive group 
of cybertroopers was necessary for the GE13 because “the opposition were 
releasing lies through Facebook, Twitter and through blogs” and it was 
important the government was able to “counter false news more quickly” 
through social media.  
The opposition also increased its role in cyberspace. The PKR em-
ployed the former Malaysian Insider sub-editor Praba Ganeshan as a social-
media strategist from April 2012. He managed a team of about four people. 
Ganeshan (interview, 17 June 2013) argues that most of the campaign on 
social media was “powered organically by thousands of Malaysians” and that 
the party “mostly went along for the ride”. The opposition did, of course, 
have tactics and strategies to use the space effectively. The PKR had an 
election smart-phone app showing the locations of future ceramah [public 
talks]. One of the opposition’s most effective uses of social media was to 
use Twitter as a pseudo-media centre. As press conferences were not well-
attended by many government-owned or -controlled news sites, Twitter 
attempts to facilitate the distribution of information that the mainstream 
media ignores. Fahmi Fadzil was Political Secretary Information Chief for 
Keadilan (based in Kuala Lumpur) and a former presenter of ‘The Fairly 
Current Show’, which was uploaded and distributed through YouTube. 
Fadzil explained:  
We know the algorithm of these tools is what is popular, but this is 
not reflected in the other mainstream media. We are leveraging on 
personality and celebrities. We tried to explicitly use satire, which is 
the essence of the culture of social media, particularly amongst young 
people (interview, 12 June 2013).  
Medaline Chang, who worked as the DAP’s social-media officer, said: “We 
geared everything in our social-media strategy towards creating visuals for 
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Facebook. We wanted people to share information from our own pages as it 
draws them back to our main sites” (interview, 18 June 2013). The DAP also 
put a significant proportion of their advertising funds into Facebook adver-
tisements, having realised the importance of maintaining a social-media 
presence.  
Yet claims of opposition ‘cyberwar’ activities were raised by UMNO 
officials and published in mainstream newspapers. Marzuki Mohamad said:  
The opposition has done a good job of demonising us on social me-
dia. They had a Red Bean Army – 1,000-2,000 people. We started late 
and had fewer people, and [so] our cybertroopers were blasted out 
(interview, 15 June 2013).  
Tun Faisal believes these social-media sites were an important reason why 
Chinese votes went to the opposition, claiming “ethnic sentiments to get 
Chinese and Indian votes” were common on these sites (interview, 15 June 
2013). After the election, Shahidan Kassim, a minister in the Prime Minis-
ter’s Department, called for a Royal Commission Inquiry into the opposi-
tion’s use of social media – in particular the DAP’s ‘cybertroopers’, popular-
ly known as ‘The Red Bean Army’. The term was pushed by blogger Helen 
Ang and by pro-government newspapers Utusan Malaysia, The Star and The 
New Straits Times.6 Some websites even published a list of Facebook pages 
and names of the people involved in the so-called ‘Red Bean Army’. After 
the election, Home Minister Zahid Hamidi told Parliament that “the Red 
Bean Army and its ilk” of 3,000 ‘cybertroopers’ should face criminal and 
civil action for spreading lies through the Internet (Malaysia Chronicle 2013). 
The existence of the group has been strongly denied by the DAP, who argue 
it is made up of pro-government media (The Malay Mail 2013). 
The DAP’s Medaline Chang said the ‘Red Bean Army’ was a group of 
pro-oppositionists who were regularly active online and in political social-
media networks. Chang said they were not paid by the DAP and were most-
ly “angry Chinese young men who were active online, writing anti-govern-
ment stuff on social media” (interview, 18 June 2013). One pro-DAP Face-
book page, ‘We Fully Support <PKR>DAP’, had Chinese-language com-
mentary and photos on it, and as of July 2013 it had over 460,000 likes, only 
slightly fewer than the DAP’s main Facebook page (with 510,000). In a 
6  For example, ‘Beware of DAP’s cyber-troopers’, New Straits Times, 5 June 2013; 
‘DAP’s “Red Bean Army” firing on all cylinders’, 3 June 2013 and ‘Cybertroopers 
stooping low with personal attacks and wild celebrations’, 3 May 2013, both pub-
lished in The Star; ‘DAP upah Red Bean Army ‘bunuh orang’’, 3 May 2013 and 
‘DAP taja ‘Red Bean Army’ burukkan kerajaan’, 4 May 2013, both published in 
Utusan Malaysia.  
 Negotiating Media ‘Balance’ in Malaysia’s 2013 GE 47 
personal interview in 2013, Ganeshan estimated that an individual MP might 
hire two or three people to attend Pakatan events and to support their boss 
by “making a lot of noise online” about an event or policy. However, most 
DAP ‘cybertroopers’ who slandered politically active people online were 
unlikely to be paid by the political parties. Ganeshan agreed there were “grey 
areas” where the PKR would seemingly encourage the spread of anti-
government slogans and rhetoric through its own social-media platforms, 
admitting to “fuelling the fire on many occasions”, but he claimed these 
were “initially started by individual people, not by our parties. Mostly, it’s 
people passing information on to other people, not party to party” (inter-
view, 17 June 2013).  
Both the government and the opposition had certainly paid people to 
further their cause on social media during the GE13, and they both encour-
aged their supporters to be more pro-active politically in the realm of cyber-
space. This is not to dismiss the broader BN public-relations ‘machine’ in 
rural areas, where large amounts of money were spent on flags, banners and 
the general ‘campaign trail’ (Aspinall 2013). However, political-party politics 
is increasingly being fought through the domain of online and social media. 
The ruling government, who often felt defeated by the opposition in previ-
ous elections in this space since 1998, is becoming increasingly determined 
to develop strategies to compete for voters’ hearts and minds through these 
new media platforms.  
When an organisation or political party is looking to manipulate the 
flow of information, two main methods are employed. The first is to at-
tempt to limit information by hindering, censoring or creating an environ-
ment of self-censorship. During the GE13, there were only a few instances 
of information being hindered online and sporadic attempts to create an 
environment of self-censorship through social media. The Malaysian Com-
munication Multimedia Commission (MCMC) and the police had an-
nounced they were going to monitor users of social media for possible 
abuses during the election, with senior police officials declaring they would 
arrest anyone who produced defamatory and provocative comments 
through social media (ABN News 2013). However, there were few signs this 
statement actually affected the way people interacted online during the 
GE13. The use of ‘deep packet inspection’ was reported by the DAP on 20 
May 2013, which stated that “the interest of all Malaysian Internet users is at 
risk with Deep Packet Inspection equipment checking every click on the 
Internet [made by] unsuspecting Malaysians” (Goh Kheng Teong 2013) and 
YouTube videos and Facebook pages of opposition parties and online news 
media were occasionally blocked through ISP-level packet filtering of net-
work traffic. Meanwhile, Mahathir Mohamad (rather ironically) complained 
 48 Ross Tapsell 
that hackers had tampered with his blog so that people could not access it, 
and claimed he was being “silenced” (The Sydney Morning Herald 2013). While 
these are instances of information being limited online, the main feature of 
the GE13 ‘cyberwar’ was the producing and manipulating of information 
rather than the use of blatant and archaic censorship methods.  
Thus, the second option is to ‘flood the market’ with your own infor-
mation so that alternative information is lessened or lost in a sea of one’s 
own content or misinformation. Louw (2010) has argued that in Western 
democracies since the late twentieth century, public-relations offices and 
media managers in government departments have been hired to produce 
press releases and “spin” mainstream media reports. This has led to a de-
cline in the amount of independent reporting and in the quality of news and 
information, which is drowned out by political-party public-relations content. 
As political parties in Malaysia are becoming increasingly involved in cyber-
space, the medium is becoming a place of manipulated content facilitated by 
political staff, public-relations experts, paid bloggers and ‘cybertroopers’. 
Malaysia’s GE13 shows the ability of political parties to drown out the po-
tential for truthful, fair and independent information and analysis – key 
features of the Fifth Estate concept.  
Mainstream Media 
The notion of the media as the ‘Fourth Estate’ has never really held sway in 
Malaysia, especially since the racial riots of 13 May 1969 (Mohd Azizuddin 
2005: 347) when the media was placed under tight state control. Since that 
time, print and television media has been muzzled – its role projected by the 
government and many within the industry as predominantly to report “good 
news” regarding government policy, racial harmony and national identity. 
The media’s role as a “watchdog” was seen as a ‘Western’ notion of the role 
of journalism and news reporting. Malaysian leaders (and those elsewhere in 
Asia) advocated ‘developmental journalism’ – a form of journalism which 
assists in the process of nation-building and development and where the 
press is not a natural adversary of the government (see Loo 2000: 216–218). 
Malaysia’s current Prime Minister, Najib Razak, echoed this sentiment in 
2010 when he said: “A symbiotic relationship between the press and the 
government is absolutely critical for our future and development as a nation” 
(CIJ 2011: 34). While there were periods of increased media freedom before 
reformasi in 1998, the official line has traditionally been that the country is not 
ready for greater freedom of the press yet as that would lead to political 
instability and inter-ethnic unrest (Mahathir 1989: 107–117; Mohd Az-
izuddin 2005: 345). Of course, many Malaysian media practitioners have 
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been advocating greater press freedom and a more independent, balanced 
media for decades, but their efforts have largely been subverted by the BN 
(Tapsell 2013). Furthermore, the BN has often used ‘developmental journal-
ism’ to deny the opposition broadcasting time on national radio and televi-
sion stations. While the Internet has led to more openness online, the lack 
of Internet access in rural areas means voters there encounter less diverse 
viewpoints. The opposition does publish party-owned print news, namely 
Harakah (PAS) and The Rocket (DAP), but prior to the GE13, deputy oppo-
sition leader Nurul Izzah, daughter of Anwar Ibrahim, was denied a permit 
to start a newspaper (Utusan Rakyat). She made the following prediction 
recently:  
The mainstream press will continue to stay relevant, especially for the 
rural constituency in Malaysia – a crucial block for us, considering 
their continuing loyalty for the current establishment. As such, the 
only way to counter the current spin and hate-mongering by the Ma-
lay print medium is to provide an alternative for the Malay electorate 
(e-mail correspondence, 25 July 2013).  
Media-freedom activists and journalists in Malaysia and elsewhere have 
focused on the notion of ‘keeping a political balance’ as a key professional 
practice in journalism. That is, the ability to report on the opposition as well 
as the government, or to ‘balance’ positive pro-government voices with 
critical ones. The GE13 did see some privately owned mainstream media 
companies look to be more balanced in their coverage. This drive for fair-
ness can be attributed to a number of factors outlined below.  
 Some mainstream media companies in Malaysia are pushing a business 
model of ‘balanced’ coverage in order to increase sales and profits. This 
model is to distinguish themselves from the other players in the media mar-
ket which are predominantly pro-government in their coverage. For example, 
the daily Malay-language newspaper, Sinar Harian, is published by Kumpulan 
Karangkraf, a company owned by Hussamuddin Yaacub. Chief editor Abdul 
Jalil Ali said in an interview on 22 June 2013: “We believe if the newspaper 
is government-friendly, it won’t be reader-friendly. Our readers determine 
our survival.” According to Jalil, the government and opposition placed 
advertisements in his newspaper during the election period:  
During the election, we played aggressive, in part to get sales. We 
could see ad revenue from UMNO, because they thought that non-
pro-government people were reading it. We think neutrality means 
advertising revenue (interview, 22 June 2013).  
Another newspaper which trumpeted balance and truth during the GE13 
was the Oriental Daily. Established in 2003, this Chinese-language newspaper 
 50 Ross Tapsell 
is owned by the KTS Group, which also owns a Sarawak timber company 
and has close links to Abdul Taib Mahmud, who has been in power for over 
30 years in Sarawak, Malaysian Borneo. Thus, the Oriental Daily is not with-
out political connections or free from ownership persuasions.7 Still, chief 
editor Ding Lee Leong said the aim of the paper was predominantly about 
making a profit, and that the owner, Henry Lau, “is a businessman – [so] as 
long as you are making money, he is happy” (interview, 20 June 2013). Re-
cent changes in the Malaysian media suggest an increasingly transformative 
landscape. Tong Kooi Ong controls The Edge Media Group, which pub-
lishes The Edge in Malaysia and Singapore. The Edge, launched in 1994, only 
has a circulation of 20,000, but in March 2013 it nonetheless launched a 
digital regional news weekly called The Edge Review. It also established a mag-
azine specifically for the iPad called Bumble Bee, run by media-freedom cam-
paigner Jason Tan. The Edge is now in competition with Focus Malaysia, an 
English business weekly launched in December 2012. Tong Kooi Ong es-
tablished FZ, a free online daily newspaper, in October 2012. Its masthead 
reads “Freedom of Expression, Fairness in Articulation”. The Malay Mail was 
taken over by Redberry (owned by Siew Ka Wei) in 2009. It buys content 
from Malaysiakini and the pro-government blog The Mole <www.mole.my>. 
Chief executive officer Phillip Karuppiah said it was “in line with the edito-
rial strategy of the new Malay Mail, which is to give readers both sides of the 
story pertaining to an issue” (Malaysiakini 2013b). After the GE13, it hired 
ten journalists from The Malaysian Insider to further professionalise its model 
of online journalism.  
The daily sales of most English- and Bahasa-language newspapers de-
creased in the period from 2006 to 2012, with only the tabloids The Sun and 
Harian Metro achieving a growth in circulation during this time.8 The New 
Straits Times’ circulation was 100,382 in 2012, lower than any main English-, 
Malay- or Chinese-language daily newspaper in Malaysia (Malaysia Media 
Planning Guide 2013). Shares in the newspaper Utusan Melayu were trading at 
62 cents in July 2013, down from 86 cents in March 2012 (The Wall Street 
Journal 2013). While the decline in share price and circulation of newspapers 
is hardly unique to Malaysia, it is important to recognise that in the more 
privately owned media, circulation revenue is of a higher percentage than 
7  The KTS Group also owns See Hua Daily News (in Chinese), The Borneo Post (in 
English) and Utusan Borneo (in Malay) published in Sabah and Sarawak. The KTS 
Group has been criticised for its conflict of interest in media and palm-oil planta-
tions in the region. 
8  According to the Malaysian Audit Bureau Circulations, circulation of The Sun rose 
from 256,486 in 2006 to 301,853 in 2012. Harian Metro’s circulation rose from 
289,315 in 2006 to 394,026 in 2012.  
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advertising revenue. For example, in the Oriental Daily and The Edge, circula-
tion sales account for 30 per cent of overall profits, while only 16 per cent 
of Sin Chew Daily’s revenue comes from circulation sales, and in the New 
Straits Times and The Star it is only six per cent. With Malaysia’s overall me-
dia-advertising revenue dropping 1.2 per cent in 2012 and advertising reve-
nue in newspapers declining continually (Media Planning Guide Malaysia 2013: 
26), there is increased pressure on print publications to make more profit 
from circulation sales. 
According to a recent study by Nottingham University, all the chief edi-
tors of these aforementioned news organisations believed that ‘balance’ was 
what separated them from other media companies in the market. Sinar Hari-
an is looking to establish itself as more ‘balanced’ than its Malay-language 
newspaper rivals Utusan Malaysia and Berita Harian, for instance, which have 
been consistently pro-government in their coverage.9 Ding from the Oriental 
Daily claims ‘balance’ separates his paper from other Chinese-language dai-
lies, which are closely tied to the MCA.10 He often attended meetings with 
the government where he responded to criticism by stating: “You have to let 
the print media have more freedom because we are losing credibility.” He 
said it was clear from his internal surveys that “people get annoyed if you 
don’t say what things you want them to say” (interview, 20 June 2013). With 
around 90 per cent of the Chinese going to the opposition at the GE13, it is 
clear that being pro-government would not be good for sales. On election 
day, independent online news source Malaysakini drew 2.6 million unique 
visitors, while The Malaysian Insider saw a 55 per-cent jump to nearly a million 
visitors. In contrast, The Star, which is 42.5 per cent owned by the MCA, saw 
its online visitors drop 22 per cent to 1.4 million (The Sunday Times 2013). 
After the election, The Star invited Fahmi Fadzil and Ong Kian Ming (a 
DAP election strategist) to write for it as opinion columnists. Chief editor 
Wong Chun Wai said after the election it was clear The Star needed to go for 
“more independent and bold coverage” (The Sunday Times 2013).11  
The main television stations in Malaysia are all owned by the govern-
ment-controlled Media Prima Berhad. However, Ananda Krishnan, Malay-
sia’s second-richest person, controls Astro, a satellite-television operator 
9  Nottingham University (2013). Its ‘Watching the Watchdog’ project showed that 
the government gets the most coverage and the most favourable reporting in the 
Malay-language newspapers.  
10  The Oriental Daily’s two main competitors are Sin Chew and China Press, both owned 
by Media Chinese International Bhd. 
11  In addition, Malaysiakini (2013c) reported on 26 August 2013 that The Star’s net 
profits were down 29 per cent in the six-month period from January to June 2013 
(which included the GE13), while its revenue fell 10.9 per cent in the same period. 
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with a subscriber base of three million people. Its news station, Astro Awani, 
was established in late 2007 largely to cover international news, but in 2008 
it also covered the general election and changed its business plan to hire 
more journalists to cover Malaysian news. Astro had tried to be more bal-
anced in its coverage of the GE13 to improve its subscriber base and to 
compete with government-owned news station TV3. A meeting prior to the 
election determined that coverage would be focused on interviews of voters 
rather than politicians.12 The media company had tried to be ‘balanced’ by 
hearing from voters who were pro-BN, pro-opposition and undecided. 
Managing editor and news presenter Suhaimi Sulaiman explained Astro’s 
approach: “Seventy percent of our news content is about the people. We 
focus on people’s stories, airing their views and saying what they expect 
from political candidates” (The Star 2013). When questioned by the govern-
ment as to why they were covering voters who sided with the opposition, 
Astro Awani’s management attempted to explain that balanced journalism 
was both crucial for gaining more subscribers and inherent in their editorial 
policy. As we shall see later, this met with mixed success, but the important 
conclusion here is the potential change in the television industry due to the 
arrival of cable subscription. Another new cable-television operator is going 
to be established in 2014: ABN Media Group owned by Kenneth Eswaran. 
Television in Malaysia has been the realm of state-owned enterprises, but 
subscription-based television means a more detailed understanding of the 
market, which will pay for television stations. The Astro Awani example 
shows that its model is to push for more balanced journalism to separate its 
business model from state-owned free-to-air television.  
BFM, the radio station, was also considered to be more balanced in its 
coverage during the GE13. It was explicitly told by the MCNC that its li-
cence did not include a discussion of politics (only business and finance) and 
that it should not cover the election. BFM owner Malik Ali subsequently 
wrote a letter of objection to the MCNC, which did not respond, so his 
network covered the election anyway from nomination day until election day. 
A section on BFM’s website on ‘GE13’ saw video interviews uploaded, 
including one with opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim. BFM presenter Sha-
raad Kuttan, a long-term advocate of press-freedom movements in Malaysia, 
said:  
I think you see the practice of the media as ‘fourth estate’ in pockets 
across all media. But perhaps BFM’s cache as an organisation dedicat-
12  The sources from Astro Awani who were interviewed preferred to remain anony-
mous. 
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ed to this function of the media is more pronounced (interview, 21 
June 2013). 
A further sign that mainstream media might be able to reject appeals from 
the government to report anti-opposition stories and thus report with more 
‘balance’ has been the apparent emancipation of the Malaysian judiciary and 
legal restrictions, which previously muzzled the press. Newspaper editors 
interviewed for this research admitted there were still concerns with laws 
which cover the mainstream media, but changes to the PPPA (where licenc-
es do not need to be renewed on an annual basis) had meant they are more 
willing to publish stories which were not positive towards the government. 
However, strict government regulations still dictate the operations of the 
mainstream media. BFM, for example, is only allowed to broadcast in the 
capital city of Kuala Lumpur and its surrounding area; it is not allowed to do 
so in other parts of the country, in particular the rural areas of Sabah and 
Sarawak. Mainstream media owners in Malaysia still need relatively close ties 
with influential elites in power in order to keep their media organisations 
running. While these companies are permitted licences to publish and 
broadcast, online news portal Malaysiakini was forced to take the govern-
ment to court in an attempt to obtain a print licence of its own. Thus, the 
government seems to be selective in the issuance of printing licences, yet 
recent court rulings project a more liberal approach to the mainstream me-
dia industry. 
Editors interviewed for this research admitted to rejecting government-
created stories designed as “anti-Anwar” or “anti-opposition” pieces. They 
did so by checking these stories with their legal departments, where the 
response was often to be wary of defamation suits. To avoid defamation, the 
accused (in most cases opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim) should receive a 
right of reply. When the government would not agree to allow Anwar this 
right, the story could not run for fear the company would be sued. The 
government-owned paper Utusan Malaysia had previously been sued by the 
opposition party, the DAP, and editors claimed this action set an important 
precedent for other newspapers in the country.13  
This is not to say that these companies were able to resist all forms of 
government control during the GE13. The main pressures were officials 
making calls to newsrooms with instructions on what and what not to pub-
lish. Editors admitted to pressures from government bodies such as the 
13  Karpal Singh sued Utusan Melayu, publisher of Utusan Malaysia, for ten million 
MYR (over 3 million USD) in 2008. The DAP sued Utusan Malaysia again as re-
cently as August 2013, claiming its source of information was a “Father Augusten 
Chen”, but the purported fraud allegations against the DAP turned out to be com-
pletely fictitious.  
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MCMC, the police and specific politicians. Ding (from the Oriental Daily) 
said:  
We can’t say that we were completely neutral during the GE13; we 
were slanted towards the government. I don’t deny that we compro-
mise with the government on stories, but comparatively [speaking], 
we feel we were much better than others in the Chinese-language 
press (interview, 20 June 2013).  
Jalil was often called up by government officials and occasionally by opposi-
tion officials, who reprimanded him for certain stories. He claims this 
showed his news organisation was “balanced” if both parties were complain-
ing (interview, 22 June 2013). BFM is currently being investigated because of 
an interview on the Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index, which 
aired just before the general election. Melisa Idris (the presenter) and Malek 
Ali (the owner of the radio station) have both been interviewed by the 
MCMC over the matter. During the GE13, Astro Awani was appointed a 
news controller by the MCMC; every potential story had to be run through 
this government ‘employee’ for approval. Online news copy was censored. 
Astro also had a five-minute delay on broadcasts, 14  although censorship 
through this method was less about political stories and more due to “moral” 
coverage.15 Both Jalil and Ding spoke of “softening the situation” by pub-
lishing information about the opposition on page three. Jalil said that when 
complaints came through from the government about Sinar Harian’s cover-
age, his response was to state that other media, including international net-
works such as the BBC or Al Jazeera, were doing the same thing and that he 
would lose sales if he chose not to cover the story. He said his consistent 
line towards both parties was “news for the value of news, not to back Najib 
or Anwar” (interview, 22 June 2013). 
This section has shown that amongst media which is privately owned 
rather than government-owned, there is a movement in the direction of 
balanced coverage of politics and elections, if for no other reason than to 
improve the financial position of the media organisation. Further research 
could investigate government-owned media during the GE13 and the poten-
tial for change within these companies as the media landscape changes. 
Testimony from the chief editors and media practitioners interviewed for 
this paper showed that pressure was still being applied on them to be pro-
14  Astro Awani did manage to convince the government that on election night, a five-
minute delay would see them lose viewers and defeat the purpose of their so-called 
‘live coverage’, so election night was covered live. 
15  For example, footage showing the performer Shakira dressed provocatively and 
displaying a body tattoo was censored.  
 Negotiating Media ‘Balance’ in Malaysia’s 2013 GE 55 
government in their coverage, but their business model of reporting with 
balance was, for the most part, maintained. This research has shown that 
some mainstream Malaysian media outlets are attempting to move away 
from the overt pro-government messages. However, this process is both 
sporadic and gradual in the mainstream media industry.  
Conclusion  
This article has analysed two important trends in Malaysia’s media during 
the GE13. First, online and social media have been increasingly influenced 
by political parties, in particular UMNO, to create greater polarisation and 
sensationalism rather than accurate and fair reporting. Despite the hope that 
the “Fifth Estate” is providing a voice for ordinary citizens to report the 
truth, political parties gained greater control over this space and manipulated 
it more during the GE13. This led to an increasingly partisan and polemic 
cyberwar between political parties and their supporters. This is not to say 
that the Internet and social media are not challenging the monopolisation of 
the production of media content which previously existed in Malaysia. As 
this article has shown, the increased diversity of viewpoints now available 
online has led to changes in thinking about the nature of journalism within 
the mainstream media outlets and by government officials. Yet as Pepinsky 
(2013) and others have argued, there is little indication that the Fifth Estate 
itself has fundamentally changed the way the BN regime has ruled since the 
1970s. This article has shown that the increased role of political parties in 
manipulating content online suggests that any conclusions that the Fifth 
Estate might lead to drastic political change in Malaysia are somewhat prem-
ature.  
Second, within some mainstream media organisations, there was a de-
sire to become non-partisan, despite attempts at control by the government. 
In many cases, these news organisations were able to report more freely 
than the government would have wished. The relative success of media 
organisations in Malaysia that attempted a more balanced form of journal-
ism during the GE13, mostly with support from their private owners, sug-
gests this could be a growing trend. While many newspapers previously 
could – and for the moment still can – survive as partisan pro-government 
news providers in a marketplace without competition, the rise of alternative 
sources of information via the Internet has meant this business model has 
been increasingly difficult to sustain. However, the question remains as to 
whether the Malaysian government will crack down on non-partisan media 
companies in the future. The BN has a history of “backlash and retaliation” 
after a period of liberalisation in order to preserve their electoral authoritari-
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an regime (Case 2010). This has included crackdowns on any potential liber-
alisation of the media (Tapsell 2013). Yet the decline in readership and circu-
lation of government-owned newspapers suggests Malaysians with access to 
the Internet are increasingly moving away from government-controlled news. 
This has actually been accepted in some government circles; in an interview 
held on 19 June 2013, for example, UMNO’s Saifuddin Abdullah said:  
We overspin. For example, like we did with the Bersih rallies, saying 
there were only 20,000 people [when there were approximately 
50,000]. It doesn’t work – people switch off. We lost the mainstream.  
Marzuki said in an interview on 15 June 2013 that the relevance of the main-
stream media was diminishing: 
It’s becoming futile for the government to attempt to control the 
[mainstream] media. Do newspapers like Utusan Malaysia really domi-
nate the discourse? They only have a circulation of about 400,000. 
Meanwhile, social media is growing and becoming more political. 
This article has provided glimpses into the Malaysian mainstream media 
industry as providing spaces of negotiation and contestation, while con-
versely, it has demonstrated the possibility of cyberspace being manipulated 
and partisan, thus giving voice to existing elites in Malaysian society. The 
question remains whether these circumstances will be able to provide an 
impetus in the direction of media liberalisation in Malaysia. That the main-
stream print media is undergoing rapid change is not limited to Malaysia, of 
course; newspaper circulation is decreasing worldwide. As a result, newspa-
pers around the globe are increasingly attempting to adapt their business 
models to become more “multi-platform news services”. Malaysia’s media is 
also changing in this way, which is already being reflected in the newsrooms 
of Astro Awani, BFM and Malaysiakini (Tapsell 2012). As all platforms con-
verge, so, too, will the distinction between the so-called “Fifth Estate” (so-
cial media, citizen journalism and blogging) and the traditional mainstream 
media. As these platforms collide, there may only be one winner in the battle 
for media power and control. 
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